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1 Introduction
Eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which we deal with in the cur-
rent paper, that is Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Estonia, have managed to achieve tremendous economic and political
progress in the last twenty years. Not only have they succeeded in building robust
democratic and free market institutions in these years, but also in restructuring their
economies, which had been suffering from serious underdevelopment and misman-
agement in the communist years. Furthermore, their association with the European
Union (EU), and the subsequent EU accession in 2004, were remarkable achievements
which further boosted their economic convergence with Western Europe. Yet, social
change in CEECs was certainly not as fast as the institutional and economic one. Pat-
terns of social ties people form and their attitudes towards others, inherited from the
communist past and then only petrified in the turbulent years of transition – rare so-
cial ties, predominantly confined to a narrow circle of family and friends, and a strong
imperative not to trust strangers – are now often named as important impediments
to CEECs’ further economic development and their catch-up with the EU-15.
It is however not yet well understood how such social background might affect
individuals’ economic activity at large. The objective of the current paper is thus to
shed new light on this issue by testing the hypothesis that extremely low levels of
bridging social capital and trust, formed in the post-socialist EU countries in their
communist and transition years, might slow down their current economic catch-up
with the EU-15. The mechanism tested here is based on the conjecture that citizens
of CEECs may be trapped in a low bridging social capital–low trust equilibrium where
forming social ties with dissimilar people is discouraged by the lack of general trust,
and conversely – forming social trust is hampered by little social exposure – thus
generating a vicious circle. The basis for this conjecture is the fact that bridging
social capital and trust are robustly correlated, both between and within countries,
even if a wide range of individuals’ characteristics is controlled for.
The aforementioned vicious-circle hypothesis has been formalized in a compan-
ion paper to this one, Growiec and Growiec (2010b). There, we have put forward
a microfounded economic model where social networks and trust attitudes of opti-
mally behaved individuals influence their economic decisions, giving rise to multiple
equilibria. Here, we quote some of the results from those theoretical investigations
and then confront them with World Values Survey (WVS) data from the CEECs.
Our empirical approach consists in estimating micro-level regression equations, ex-
plaining individuals’ earnings and subjective well-being. Our preferred econometric
technique is instrumental variables (IV) regression, which allows us to control for the
endogeneity of social capital formation – both predicted by theory and confirmed in
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appropriate econometric tests – and the endogeneity of income, which is a naturally
important determinant of individual well-being.
Hence, the primary contribution of the current paper to the existing literature lies
in adding an important social dimension to the discussion on CEECs’ economic con-
vergence with the EU, assessing the impact of the specific shape of social networks and
attitudes which have formed in CEE countries in their communist as well as transi-
tion years, on their current economic performance. In the second step of our analysis,
these underlying social characteristics will also be related to the levels of individuals’
subjective well-being. This will help us confirm that they indeed have a profound
impact not only on economic performance, but also on the self-reported levels of hap-
piness, even after controlling for income disparities. Our paper can thus improve the
understanding why CEECs, on average, lag behind EU-15 not only economically, but
also in terms of reported well-being.
Two complementary hypotheses will be tested here, regarding bridging and bond-
ing social capital, respectively. The first of these hypotheses is that very low levels
of bridging social capital (i.e. very rare social ties with people in a different socio-
economic position, cf. Putnam 2000; Leonard, 2008) found in post-socialist countries
of the European Union (EU) – cf. Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi (2004), Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and
Lehtonen (2006) – act as an impediment for their economic catch-up with wealthier
EU countries. More specifically, we will investigate the possibility that several CEE
countries could be trapped in a low bridging social capital–low trust equilibrium
where the formation of social ties with dissimilar people is systematically discour-
aged by the lack of general trust, and conversely, where the low levels of trust are
reinforced by the lack of contact with dissimilar others (cf. K. Growiec, 2009a,b).
Being “trapped” in the currently discussed equilibrium would then hamper the pace
of economic convergence by introducing substantial transaction costs, slowing down
the flow of information, preventing the introduction of innovative ideas, and limiting
people’s cooperativeness and thrift (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001;
Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Florida, 2004; Czapin´ski, 2007; Klapwijk and Van Lange,
2009). These effects are also present in our data, where bridging social capital, trust,
and individual earnings are significantly and positively correlated, even if a wide range
of individual characteristics and country effects are controlled for.
Having checked whether our data provide sufficient support for this view of con-
temporary socio-economic change in CEE countries, we shall proceed to the discussion
of the possible ways out of the low bridging social capital–low trust trap. Apart from
the obvious one, through gradual modernization and aggregate economic convergence
with the wealthier EU countries (Czapin´ski, 2007), we shall also discuss a policy-
relevant alternative – through increased labor market participation. Indeed, there is
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evidence that the employed not only create wealthier households, but also have more
bridging social capital, less bonding social capital, and are on average more inclined
to trust strangers.
Our second hypothesis relates to bonding social capital. We suppose that this
form of social capital, based on exclusive networks with people in a similar socio-
economic position (primarily family members) should, as opposed to bridging social
capital, work against quick modernization and economic development by attaching
people to their traditional values and modes of behavior, lowering their innovativeness,
adaptivity and mobility (Florida, 2004, Alesina and Giuliano, 2007; Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2008), and adding extra transaction costs due to the limited trust
towards others (Williamson, 1987). We will try to quantify how important these
mechanisms are in CEE countries. At this point, it should be noted that, as opposed
to bridging social capital, the experiences of CEECs with respect to bonding social
capital are quite mixed: on the one hand, Poland lies among the countries with
strongest family ties in the world (cf. Alesina and Giuliano, 2007), whereas, e.g., in
the Czech Republic, Estonia, or Lithuania, these ties are not at all stronger than in an
average EU country. We would like to take advantage of this variation in our data to
obtain clearer results on the effects of bonding social capital on individuals’ economic
performance which have hitherto been rather inconclusive (Chiesi, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the so-
ciological background to our considerations. Section 3 quotes a few corollaries from
the underlying theoretical model, derived in Growiec and Growiec (2010b). Section 4
discusses measurement issues and presents the preliminary evidence on the patterns
of social capital, trust, and economic development observed in CEECs, and highlights
the similarities and differences between them. It thereby provides the foundations for
our main hypotheses, thoroughly tested in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The current paper relates to four complementary strands of sociological and psycho-
logical literature. The first of them relates to the definition and measurement of
social capital. The principal idea which we build on here is to operationalize bridging
and bonding social capital via the characteristics of individuals’ social networks (cf.
Lin, 2001). Such an approach is especially fruitful analytically, because it enables
one to delineate people’s objective behavior (maintaining social contacts with oth-
ers) from social norms (trust, reciprocity). The social network perspective on social
capital is widely shared (Lin, 2001; Kadushin, 2002; Li, Pickles, and Savage, 2005;
Burt, 2005); moreover, this position leads to being more specific on social networks
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people form and, as a consequence, to what resources they have access (Bourdieu,
1986; Lin, 2001). Putnam’s (2000) distinction between bridging social capital (social
ties with dissimilar others) and bonding social capital (social ties with similar others)
has by now become a standard in social capital studies; on the other hand, there is
still little congruence in the literature on the exact empirical method of social capital
measurement. In micro-level analyses, bridging social capital is often measured as
the frequency of social contact with people in a different social-economic position to
oneself. With such an approach, there always remains the problem of data avail-
ability, though. In the current paper, this problem will force us to rely on a proxy
operationalization of bonding social capital via declarations of importance of family
in one’s life and the content of the role of parent that one holds.
The second relevant strand of sociological literature relates to welfare state regimes
(as defined by Standing, 1998), and the specificity of post-socialist countries in this
respect. Standing (1998) uses two criteria to identify welfare state regimes: the degree
of de-commodification and the type of stratification. The former refers to the degree
to which social-political benefits are social rights independent of markets (and family
relations), and the latter one captures the extent of social-political systems, i.e. the
universality of benefits (Standing, 1998; Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen, 2006). According
to these authors, five welfare state regimes can be distinguished in Europe along
these lines: liberal, conservative, Nordic, Mediterranean, and post-socialist. Welfare
state regimes identified by Standing correspond with associated Inglehart and Baker’s
(2000) findings in the following way: Inglehart and Baker argue that “Protestant
cultural heritage is associated with the syndrome of general trust, tolerance, well-
being, and postmaterialism that constitutes self-expression values while an Orthodox
religious heritage and communist historical heritage both show a negative impact
on these values, even after controlling for differences in economic level and social
structure” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 39-40). Moreover, as discussed by Sztompka
(2004) and Kornai and Rose-Ackerman (2004), the difficult economic and political
situation in the CEE countries in the communist era forced people to form closed
social networks, which helped “get by”, but to which was their trust limited, and
learned not to trust anyone outside of the ingroup. Since social networks and people’s
attitudes are, in principle, very persistent, the lack of bridging social capital and
general trust was carried forward into the years of political and economic transition,
which made the subsequent social change even more “traumatic”.1 Despite forming
1Complementarily, despite these overlapping differences between welfare state regimes and coun-
tries with Protestant, Orthodox, or Communist historical heritage, it is found that the worldviews
of rich societies differ markedly from those of poor societies. The rich, postindustrial societies have
already gone through a shift from the emphasis on economic and physical security toward the em-
phasis on expressive values, whereas the poorer post-socialist CEE countries have not experienced
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a common welfare state regime, CEE countries are not homogenous in terms of their
social capital, though: for example, bonding social capital is widely present in Poland
but not that much in other CEE countries (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007).2
The third strand of sociological and psychological literature related to the current
study deals with general trust. Arguably, modern societies are more then ever based
on general trust and social interactions (Simmel, 1971; Giddens, 1991; Sztompka,
1999; Yamagishi, 2002; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Klapwijk and Van Lange, 2009);
without trust societies would disintegrate as trust is a synthetic force within the
society (Simmel, 1950; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). At the same time,
general trust turns out to be closely related to bridging social capital while distrust –
with bonding social capital; previous findings show that there are mutually reinforcing
relationships between social capital and general trust (K. Growiec, 2009a,b). At the
individual level, people whose prevailing form of social capital is the bonding one are
significantly more likely to present general distrust than those with abundant bridging
social capital.3
The fourth strand of literature which we shall refer to deals with individuals’
motivations to accumulate social capital. Indeed, while forming their social networks,
individuals may be driven by a number of motivations: in particular, they may seek to
satisfy their safety drive or their effectiveness drive (Bowlby 1969; Greenberg, 1991).
Safety is associated with affiliation and the density of networks, whereas effectiveness
– with competition and structural holes (Burt, 1992). These different functions are
such a shift yet.
2A closer look at the characteristics of CEECs proves that these countries are clearly heteroge-
neous in terms of their social capital resources. According to Wallace and Pichler (2007), “Slovenia
is more like a Nordic welfare regime” in terms of its social capital stock; Romania and Bulgaria ”re-
semble Southern welfare states with a declining coverage of social risks for much of the population
since the transition from communism”; and the Czech Republic “has adopted many aspects of the
insurance-based German system”. Based on their research results, Wallace and Pichler claim that it
is more reasonable to divide the group of CEE countries into three separate sub-groups: the Czech
Republic, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia would form the first group, characterized by medium bridg-
ing social capital resources and medium bonding social capital resources; Lithuania and Bulgaria as
the second group with high bonding social capital and low bridging social capital, and Poland, Esto-
nia, Romania and Hungary as a third group with low bonding social capital and low bridging social
capital resources. One has to remember that their operationalization of bridging and bonding social
capital is markedly different from Putnam’s or Lin’s, however, and hence follow these somewhat
surprising results.
3Apart from social capital, general trust is also related to risk taking and coping with uncertainty
(Dasgupta, 1988; Molm, Takahashi and Peterson, 2000; Cook, Yamagishi, Cheshire, Cooper, Mat-
suda, and Mashima, 2005). Low-trust societies which primarily avoid risk taking, put themselves
at a competitive disadvantage in global markets by doing so, as they can’t build complex social
institutions (Fukuyama, 1995).
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served by the different forms of social capital which people build: the “motivation for
support [provided by bonding social capital] is satisfying basic needs or sustaining
status quo. Structural holes [related to bridging social capital] are (...) for creating
change and movement” (Kadushin, 2002: 86). Furthermore, different psychological
predispositions of individuals can have a marked impact on their social networks.
Individuals who value their personal identity more than their social identity are more
likely to maintain diverse social networks (Kalish and Robins, 2006), i.e., a large
stock of bridging social capital. Surprisingly, people who have many structural holes
in their network are also those who are more neurotic, but reveal a strong conviction
of control over their lives (Kalish and Robins, 2006) and are more creative (Burt,
1992).
3 Some insights from quantitative theory
In a complementary paper to the current one (Growiec and Growiec, 2010b), we have
put forward a theoretical model aimed at capturing the hypothesis that bridging
social capital and social trust can form both virtuous and vicious circles, leading to
multiple equilibria in economic performance. Our quantitative theory is based on the
assumptions that (i) individuals obtain utility not only from consumption, but also
from socializing with others, (ii) the ability to form social ties is proportional to the
individual’s stock of social capital and the pool of people with whom she could, but
has not established a tie yet, and increases with her level of trust, (iii) it is easier to
form bridging social capital if you are employed. Without going too much into details
of the model, the crucial testable insights from that theory are quoted below in the
form of propositions.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique interior steady-state equilibrium with a positive
level of bridging social capital only if the level of social trust is sufficiently high (i.e.,
exceeds a certain threshold).
Proposition 2 The level of bridging social capital in the interior steady-state equi-
librium increases with social trust, but the share of time devoted to social capital
accumulation decreases with social trust.
The qualitative insights from Proposition 2 can also be given a quantitative edge.
An example of the actual shape of these relationships has been presented in graphical
form in Figure 1.
Proposition 3 For a given level of social trust, the relationship between bridging
social capital and earnings (respectively, well-being) in the vicinity of the interior
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Figure 1: The dependence of the steady-state level of bridging social capital v∗ as
well as time devoted to its accumulation `∗v on social trust z.
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Source: Growiec and Growiec (2010b).
steady state is inverse U-shaped: at low levels of bridging social capital, it increases
earnings; at high levels, it decreases them.
Proposition 4 In the interior steady-state equilibrium, the employed have an unam-
biguously higher steady-state level of bridging social capital than the non-employed.
The amounts of time spent on social capital accumulation by the employed and non-
employed cannot be unambiguously ordered.
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between steady-state levels of bridging social
capital among the employed and the non-employed, viewed as a function of social trust
(Propositions 2 and 4). In the parametrization used in that figure, spillovers from
bridging social capital to wages are strong enough that – in line with Proposition 4 –
not only is the level of social capital unambiguously higher among the employed, but
so is the time investment in it as well. The threshold level of social trust, above which
an interior equilibrium begins to exist, is also higher in the case of the non-employed.
As far as the impacts of bonding social capital on earnings and subjective well-
being are considered, it should influence individuals’ earnings negatively, and the
direction of its impact on subjective well-being should be ambiguous (Growiec and
Growiec, 2010a).
8
Figure 2: The dependence of the steady state (`∗v, v
∗) on social trust z: comparison
of the situation of the employed and the non-employed.
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Source: Growiec and Growiec (2010b). Notation: v∗(z) – the level of bridging social capital among
the employed, v∗U (z) – among the non-employed; `
∗
v(z) – time investment in bridging social capital
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4 Measurement and preliminary evidence on intra-
country and cross-country differences
Patterns and mechanisms described in the theoretical model as well as in the asso-
ciated literature are also visible in our data. Let us however discuss measurement
issues first.
4.1 Measurement of social capital and trust
Throughout our empirical analysis, we make use of data from the 2000 wave of the
World Values Survey (WVS). The choice of this particular wave is due to the fact that
only the 2000 wave of the WVS includes an extended list of questions relevant to the
measurement of social capital. We can thus provide a sufficiently accurate description
of the bridging and bonding social capital variables in CEECs only for 2000.
As already discussed above, bridging social capital refers to forming social ties
across social cleavages and requires people to transcend their simple social identity.
For this reason, it makes sense to operationalize bridging social capital as time invest-
ments in socializing with friends, colleagues from work, friends from church, sports
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clubs, voluntary organizations, etc. Our bridging social capital measure will be con-
structed as a summary scale based on the following questions:
• “How often do you spend time with your friends”, answers: weekly, once or twice
a month, only a few times in a year, not at all.
• “How often do you spend time socially with your colleagues from work or your
profession”, answers: weekly, once or twice a month, only a few times in a year,
not at all.
• “How often do you spend time with people at your church, mosque or syna-
gogue”, answers: weekly, once or twice a month, only a few times in a year, not
at all.
• “How often do you spend time socially with people at sports clubs, voluntary or
service organization”, answers: weekly, once or twice a month, only a few times
in a year, not at all.
Bonding social capital, on the other hand, will be operationalized as the strength
of family ties and the tendency to form kinship groups based on unconditioned loy-
alty (cf. Alesina and Giuliano, 2007). Kinship ties have been already used as a proxy
measure for bonding social capital by Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen (2006) who worked
on ISSP data. In the current research, bonding social capital will be operationalized
with WVS questions measuring the importance of family in one’s life (very impor-
tant, rather important, not very important, not at all important), the perception of
parents’ duties to their children (the respondents had to choose between the following
statements: “It is parents’ duty to do their best for their children” or ”Parents have
a life of their own”), and the opinion about the respect and love children owe their
parents regardless of parents’ deeds (the pair of statements: “Regardless of what the
qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them” or
“One does not have the duty to respect and love the parents who have not earned
it by their behavior and attitudes”). These three proxy measures will be normalized
and plugged into an additive scale.
We will simultaneously monitor the mean level of social trust in each society,
measured by the frequency of affirmative answers to the survey statement: “Most
people can be trusted”(as opposed to“Can’t be too careful”). We shall also distinguish
between individuals’ self-reported level of trust towards strangers and the degree to
which they themselves are trusted. As a proxy measure of the latter, we shall use
the average level of trust in the individuals’ reference group. In our analysis, we will
stratify individuals by their country of residence and education level.
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We are going to be very careful about the distinction and mutual relationships
between bridging social capital, bonding social capital, and social trust: it might help
us show how the low bridging social capital–low trust equilibrium could pertain.
4.2 Measurement of other variables
The key dependent variables in the current study are individuals’ incomes and sub-
jective well-being. The former of these two measures is the WVS scale of incomes per
person in the household with 10 available intervals for the respondents to pick, and
the latter is the variable “feeling of happiness”, with 4 available answers (very happy,
quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy). Since income is measured per person
in the household, one must control for household size in all income regressions. Also,
the scale of incomes has country-specific income thresholds, given in the local cur-
rency, and thus one cannot compare the results internationally. The (approximately)
logarithmic scale of incomes is maintained for all countries, though.
Apart from these variables, we shall also include several other measures4 from
the WVS in our empirical regressions, potentially useful for explaining incomes and
happiness directly, or for instrumenting the endogenous measures of bridging and
bonding social capital.
Having described our operationalization of the most important variables of the
current study, and before we plunge into the main empirical investigation, we shall
now present some of the basic properties of our data.
4.3 Correlations at the individual level
In agreement with the established literature reviewed in Section 2, the societies of
CEECs record significant individual-level correlations between bridging social capital,
bonding social capital, social trust, and well-being.
As we see in Table 1, bridging social capital and trust are positively and robustly
correlated, both in the aggregate dataset and within each of the eight CEECs (that is,
controlling for country dummies), even if a wide range of additional control variables
is included. These controls include, first and foremost, bonding social capital, and
also income per adult person in the household, size of town of residence, education,
4The list includes: sex, age, age squared, employment status, student status, housewife status,
size of town of residence, household size, and being in a stable relationship. We also control for the
sense of autonomy the individual perceives to have over her own life, participation in professional
organizations, sports and recreation organizations, or education and arts organizations, as well as
the importance of religion politics in one’s life.
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sex, the stable relationship dummy, age, age squared, and subjectively reported well-
being. Even though all these correlation coefficients are significant, it must be said
that they are relatively small, and indeed much smaller than we had expected. The
potential reasons for this result are the unobserved heterogeneity of respondents, and
very noisy measurement of trust, captured by a single survey question.
Table 1: Spearman rank correlations and partial correlations.
Bridging social capital vs trust
Controls Corr. p-value
none 0,078 0
bonding 0,074 0
bonding + country dummies 0,092 0
range of controls 0,074 0
range of controls + well-being 0,062 0
In Table 2 we demonstrate that bonding social capital is, on the contrary, essen-
tially uncorrelated with social trust. The raw correlation coefficient is negative but
insignificant, and partial correlation controlling for bridging social capital and country
dummies is zero. A further addition of the above-described range of controls makes
the coefficient positive, yet still insignificant at the 10% level. This confirms that we
should not seek a consistent relationship between bonding social capital and trust in
CEECs where trust levels are generally very low.
Table 2: Spearman rank correlations and partial correlations.
Bonding social capital vs trust
Controls Corr. p-value
none -0,01 0,137
bridging -0,015 0,285
bridging + country dummies 0,001 0,947
range of controls 0,024 0,113
range of controls + well-being 0,022 0,148
Table 3 confirms that bridging and bonding social capital are distinct phenomena
not only in their relationship with social trust, but also in their own mutual cor-
relation. This correlation is marginal in the whole sample, essentially zero within
countries, and significantly positive but less than 0,05 if a range of controls (income
per adult person in the household, size of town of residence, education, sex, the
stable relationship dummy, age, age squared, subjective well-being) is added to the
regression.
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Table 3: Pearson correlations and partial correlations.
Bridging vs bonding social capital
Controls Corr. p-value
none 0,027 0,054
country dummies 0,005 0,707
range of controls 0,049 0,001
range of controls + well-being 0,043 0,003
Table 4 confirms that the relationship between bridging social capital and subjec-
tive well-being is close. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is large
(0,2 in individual survey data is a lot) and strongly significant. It is however grad-
ually reduced as certain control variables are taken care of, indicating that some of
the relationship can be captured by differences in earnings, size of town of residence,
age, etc. This issue will be scrutinized in much more detail in Section 5.
Table 4: Pearson correlations and partial correlations.
Bridging social capital vs well-being
Controls Corr. p-value
none 0,201 0
country dummies 0,168 0
range of controls 0,128 0
4.4 The importance of employment status
In our data, there are clear differences between the employed and non-employed,
both in terms of patterns of social capital formation, and levels of social trust. In
the descriptive Table 5, we see that the non-employed have (statistically) significantly
more bonding social capital, and significantly less bridging social capital and social
trust. Understandably, they also report lower incomes on average, and lower levels of
subjective well-being.
Hence, one could conjecture that not only is economic growth able to alleviate
the postulated problem of a vicious circle of low bridging social capital and low social
trust, but there should also be a link between employment and the ability to form
bridging social capital. There is abundant anecdotal evidence that if an individual is
employed, then the pool of people with whom she can establish social ties is signifi-
cantly larger than if she does not work. At the same time, her earning potential is also
markedly higher. It follows that in a society with a higher labor market participation
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rate, there should be both a higher level of average earnings (i.e., GDP per capita),
and higher levels of bridging social capital and trust. This conjecture will be verified
empirically in further sections of the current paper.
Table 5: Differences in social networks and attitudes between the employed and the
non-employed: means, and results of the t-test for equality of means (with unequal
variances). Positive t-statistics indicate that the non-employed have higher values of
the respective characteristics, and conversely.
Group Obs Mean Std Dev t-Stat p-value
bridging non-employed 2280 0,3674 0,2190 -8,3028 0,0000
employed 2801 0,4176 0,2084
bonding non-employed 2280 0,8382 0,2180 3,7034 0,0001
employed 2801 0,8149 0,2273
trust non-employed 2233 0,1885 0,3912 -3,5328 0,0002
employed 2748 0,2293 0,4204
income pc non-employed 2029 3,3815 2,0945 -28,5218 0,0000
employed 2532 5,2792 2,3948
happiness non-employed 2214 1,7611 0,7223 -8,7101 0,0000
employed 2726 1,9299 0,6183
All these low-level findings will now be contrasted with cross-country aggregate
results. We will thus identify the most apparent similarities and differences between
the eight CEECs.
4.5 Similarities and differences among CEECs
The first glance at country-wise aggregated data confirms that CEECs are heteroge-
neous in terms of their social capital resources (cf. Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen, 2006;
Alesina and Giuliano, 2007; Wallace and Pichler, 2007). It is straightforward to point
out the leaders of the region in terms of bridging social capital – the“innovative”power
– which are Estonia and Slovenia, and the leaders in terms of bonding social capital
– the traditional and “status quo maintainer” power – namely Poland. The most
advantageous position in this respect, in the sense of having the most income-, trust-
and growth-promoting potential, belongs to countries in the upper part of Figure 3
(high bridging social capital), and probably most preferably in the upper left corner
(also, low bonding social capital). The relatively most disadvantaged position is taken
by Lithuania which has both little bridging social capital and bonding social capital
resources, and Hungary whose bridging social capital resources are equally scarce. At
the same time we can see in Figure 3 that at the international level, bridging social
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capital and bonding social capital seem to be rather independent dimensions of social
capital, which is congruent with Putnam (2000).
Figure 3: Bridging and bonding social capital stocks across CEE countries.
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The second important piece of background information for this paper is the loca-
tion of CEE countries according to the average levels of subjective well-being reported
by their citizens. As is visible in Figure 4, the most satisfied with their lives are the
societies of Slovenia and Czech Republic, and the least – of Latvia and Lithuania. For
the second time Slovenia appears to be a leader of the region here – both in terms of
bridging social capital and happiness.
Thirdly, we shall also identify the cross-country relationship between bridging
social capital and social trust. At the level of country averages, these two phenomena
do not appear to be positively correlated (somewhat contrasting with the predictions
of underlying sociological theories). Instead, we see two distinct groups of countries:
the (marginally) more trusting are the Lithuanians, Czechs, Estonians, Hungarians,
and Slovenians. The most distrustful are the Slovakians, Latvians, and Polish. The
possible reason for this finding is that there might exist substantial country-specific
factors interfering with this relationship. Indeed, correlation analysis at the individual
level confirms a positive relationship between bridging social capital and trust.
In sum, scatterplots presented in Figures 3–5 indicate that CEE countries are
clearly heterogeneous in terms of their social background despite some common fea-
15
Figure 4: Bridging social capital and subjective well-being across CEE countries.
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tures (e.g. social trust is uniformly low in all considered countries, much lower than
the EU average). Interestingly, there are both “leaders” and “laggards” in social de-
velopment in the region and our task here is to investigate the factors responsible
for their position in the region, and the mechanisms which may lead to persistence
of these observed patterns. It must be remembered that countrywide averages hide
vast intra-country heterogeneity in social capital patterns and social trust, a feature
which we would like to take account of in our econometric investigation.
5 The joint impact of social capital and trust on
individuals’ incomes and subjective well-being
Let us now pass to the main results of the current study. We have run several cross-
sectional regressions explaining individuals’ incomes and subjective well-being, and
choosing the explanatory variables in line with the underlying social capital literature
and the implications of our theoretical model, in a manner similar to our earlier study
(Growiec and Growiec, 2010a). We have also included a number of control variables
in these regressions, found to have a significant impact on the dependent variables,
such as education, age, size of town of residence, etc. We have been very careful with
the treatment of endogeneity, which – alongside potential omitted variables bias –
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Figure 5: Bridging social capital and social trust across CEE countries.
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turns out to be the crucial problem here. All “central” equations of this paper have
been estimated with the instrumental variables method.
5.1 Bridging and bonding social capital and trust as deter-
minants of individual incomes
We have conducted a number of linear regression analyses, aiming at finding ro-
bust socio-economic determinants of individual incomes. The first set of results is
contained in Tables 6–7. The equations have been estimated with the instrumental
variables technique, to control for endogeneity of bridging and bonding social capi-
tal. Although it is an admittedly hard task to find good instruments for these social
variables in cross-sectional data, our final results indicate that we have succeeded in
finding such variables. As instruments for bridging and bonding social capital in the
earnings equation, we used: sex, number of children, three measures of religiosity
(survey questions: “How often do you attend religious services?”, “Do you get comfort
and strength from religion?”, and“Is religion important in your life?”), one measure of
interest in politics (survey question: “How often do you discuss political matters with
friends?”), a range of dummy variables characterizing the respondent’s membership in
organizations, and a range of dummy variables on what she perceives to be important
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child qualities (e.g., good manners, independence, honesty, imagination, etc.). Sar-
gan tests indicate that these instruments are valid, whereas underidentification tests
prove that our auxiliary regressions are able to identify the endogenous regressors
correctly with instruments. Chi-square endogeneity tests confirm that bridging and
bonding social capital are indeed correlated with the error term of the OLS regression.
Anderson-Rubin tests indicate that both endogenous variables are jointly significant
in the main equation. Our preferred specification – the central one for the current
subsection of the paper – is model (8) in Table 6, which both utilizes the instrumental
variables estimation procedure, and controls for all relevant individual characteristics.
Our results confirm that bonding social capital indeed decreases income: the more
an individual is confined to her kinship group, the less income she has, other things
equal. A tentative conclusion might be that unless individuals get out of closed kinship
groups and in-group loyalty, they will face certain limitations in their prospects for
financial success. A further interpretation of this result is that strong family ties
may restrict the scope of exploration of the labor market by an individual and limit
searching for a job on a competitive basis. Instead, individuals would rely on job
opportunities offered by the members of the kinship group that are usually limited
and might be not in line with their qualifications or expectations. In a previous paper
(Growiec and Growiec, 2010a), we have put forward a theoretical model formalizing
this idea. We have however failed to support it with the Polish dataset we used there
(bonding social capital turned out insignificant in the earnings regression). Here, a
broader dataset including also individuals from other CEECs helps draw more robust
conclusions on this relationship, strongly supporting the theory. As is demonstrated
in the appendix, however, there is quite some heterogeneity in the strength of this
effect across CEE countries.
As opposed to Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003), Florida (2004), and Growiec and
Growiec (2010a), in our baseline specification we do not find a positive relationship
between bridging social capital and earnings. If anything, this relationship is negative
here; it is however sensitive to the choice of model specification. This result may
be due to three reasons: first, the amount of time spent with friends, co-workers,
people from one’s church or voluntary organization, etc., can be heavily dependent on
people’s choice between materialist and post-materialist values. CEE countries are
known for inclination toward the former (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), so if someone
decides to devote some of her time to her circle of friends and acquaintances, it
may mean that at the same time, she would also withdraw some of her activity
from the labour market, thus lowering her earnings. The second mechanism, on the
other hand, relates to the fact that bridging social capital is relatively scarce in CEE
countries, and the employed people tend to work long hours, much longer than e.g.,
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in Western Europe. This would imply that the positive external effects of bridging
social capital on earnings are rather small in CEE countries, and easily neutralized by
the aforementioned time-substitution effects. The third reason for this result, slightly
more technical, might be due to the imperfect instrumentation of endogenous bridging
social capital in our empirical model. Perhaps in a different dataset, one could find
stronger instruments for bridging social capital, able to identify the external effects
on earnings with higher precision.
Table 6 is illustrative on the vital issue of endogeneity and omitted variables bias.
If neither of these issues is controlled for, bridging social capital is found to influence
earnings positively, and statistically significantly at 1% level. However, if one takes
into account the fact that there exists also a reverse causal link from earnings to
bridging and bonding social capital, this result disappears. It also disappears when
one controls for the impact of social trust and individuals’ freedom of choice and
control (measured by the survey question: “How much freedom of choice and control
over your actions do you have?”).
Our another finding is that, in line with our prior expectations, trust and earnings
are positively related to each other. This refers both to the extent to which one
trust others, and to the level to which she experiences trust in return (cf. Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). On average, and keeping other things
equal, the more individual trusts and is trusted, the better is she off. It supports the
idea (K. Growiec, 2009a) that bridging social capital and social trust both enhance
incomes, and operate in the same way: they both open individuals for more beneficial
situations. High trust standards probably also make contacts at the workplace more
favorable in terms of information flow, less stressful, and effectively reduce transaction
costs in doing business (Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Williamson, 1981).
Our results have also been tested for robustness against a few sets of control
variables that are known from the literature to have a significant impact on individual
income, like education, age, age squared (the Mincerian wage equation), size of town of
residence, and country specific effects. We find that better education, being employed,
and living in a bigger town or city go together with higher income. In general, the
relation between age and income is inverse-U shaped, which means that the youth
entering the job market, probably lacking work experience, are paid less than older
cohorts. The opposite is true for older people, who despite their abundant experience,
get paid less for their work than the middle-aged cohort, too. This usual result is
reversed, however, and the earnings profile becomes U-shaped, once one controls for
employment status and living in a stable relationship. This reversed result holds even
when we control for being a student or a retired person, and is probably due to the
WVS definition of income, as income per person in the household. Both old and
19
young people are much more likely to live alone than the middle-aged, however, and
they are also much less likely to live in a stable relationship. Controlling for a range of
individual characteristics, housewife status goes together with higher income, which
may suggest that this option is more common among households with higher income
in general.
Because the income classes in WVS are country-specific, country dummies5 in
Table 6 have no interpretation. For the same reason, we included all these dummies
in all regressions.
Let us now pass to the question whether there are any direct signs of interdepen-
dence between social capital and social trust. In Table 7, we present a few extensions
of regressions (7)–(8) from Table 6, allowing for extra interaction terms between our
social capital variables, trust, and employment status. As instruments for these en-
dogenous interaction terms, we use interaction terms between trust and employment
status, and sex and the measures of religiosity.
In principle, this extension does not change our results much, especially with
regard to the control variables. Also, under instrumental variables estimation, there
are no signs of significance of the interactions between any type of social capital and
employment status. On the other hand, there are interesting results regarding the
interaction between bonding social capital and trust. It turns out that the impact
of one’s individual level of trust on earnings is negative, but it may become zero or
positive if she has bonding social capital in sufficient abundance.
It is instructive to take a look at the interaction terms in specifications (2) and (5)
in Table 7 (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006, for a methodological discussion).
Marginal income effects of bonding social capital and trust, computed according to
regression (5), are as follows:
∂incomei
∂bondingi
= −2.461 + 3.626× trusti,
∂incomei
∂trusti
= −2.310 + 3.626× bondingi,
where for each individual, bonding social capital takes a value in the interval [0, 1] (the
sample mean is 0.8257), and trust is either zero or one (the mean is 0.2117). Hence,
our results suggest that if one trusts strangers, more contacts with family should
increase her earnings, ceteris paribus; if one doesn’t, they should lower them. If one
trusts strangers and at the same time, one has strong family ties, one may use the
kinship group’s resources and support to cooperate with strangers to set up a business
5The reference country is Poland.
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Table 6: Explaining incomes: finding the appropriate regression specification.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES income income income income income income income income
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
bridging 1.034*** 0.672*** 0.310** 0.272* 0.157 -0.0691 -0.438 -0.868*
[6.395] [4.295] [2.006] [1.745] [1.024] [-0.430] [-0.978] [-1.711]
bonding -0.645*** -0.438*** -0.188 -0.186 -0.319** -0.312** -1.517*** -1.415**
[-4.222] [-2.985] [-1.326] [-1.303] [-2.293] [-2.243] [-2.624] [-2.372]
trust 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.215*** 0.268*** 0.247***
[2.881] [3.069] [3.151] [2.873] [3.322] [3.077]
trust (mean) 10.81*** 2.387** 2.841*** 2.652*** 2.612*** 2.498***
[20.47] [2.566] [3.144] [2.930] [2.696] [2.589]
employed 1.106*** 1.384*** 1.101*** 1.463***
[14.67] [11.69] [13.57] [11.55]
czech 0.563*** -0.295*** 0.383*** 0.210* 0.00453 -0.0546 -0.0856 -0.171
[5.317] [-2.690] [3.902] [1.817] [0.0400] [-0.478] [-0.668] [-1.335]
hungary 0.176 -0.307*** 0.120 0.00463 -0.112 -0.0946 -0.200* -0.190
[1.569] [-2.780] [1.162] [0.0410] [-1.010] [-0.851] [-1.662] [-1.579]
latvia -1.336*** -1.424*** -1.491*** -1.448*** -1.205*** -1.198*** -1.290*** -1.276***
[-4.721] [-5.169] [-5.685] [-5.411] [-4.507] [-4.495] [-4.420] [-4.388]
lithuania 0.821*** 0.0930 0.271** 0.203 0.0712 0.0958 -0.129 -0.107
[6.006] [0.682] [2.096] [1.530] [0.551] [0.734] [-0.778] [-0.633]
estonia 0.985*** 0.497** 0.595*** 0.503** 0.328 0.277 0.146 0.106
[4.051] [2.103] [2.659] [2.206] [1.498] [1.268] [0.598] [0.434]
slovakia 1.408*** 1.283*** 1.347*** 1.329*** 1.254*** 1.253*** 1.230*** 1.243***
[12.77] [12.04] [13.23] [12.90] [12.52] [12.43] [10.44] [10.66]
slovenia 1.297*** 1.099*** 1.321*** 1.275*** 0.992*** 0.985*** 0.988*** 0.992***
[9.634] [8.491] [10.59] [10.11] [8.080] [7.962] [7.506] [7.545]
hh size 0.675*** 0.688*** 0.623*** 0.618*** 0.560*** 0.549*** 0.543*** 0.533***
[20.19] [21.38] [19.63] [19.33] [17.54] [17.06] [16.00] [15.57]
education 0.320*** 0.249*** 0.175*** 0.165*** 0.174*** 0.158***
[19.18] [8.300] [5.976] [5.611] [5.527] [5.014]
town size 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.0963*** 0.0950*** 0.0884***
[7.839] [7.676] [7.649] [7.119] [6.517] [6.031]
stable relationship 0.862*** 0.852*** 0.887*** 0.868***
[11.66] [11.36] [10.47] [10.14]
age 0.0224** 0.0240** -0.0716*** -0.0578*** -0.0772*** -0.0623***
[2.106] [2.225] [-6.185] [-4.827] [-6.045] [-4.794]
age2 -0.000478*** -0.000499*** 0.000622*** 0.000494*** 0.000674*** 0.000525***
[-4.382] [-4.512] [5.121] [3.934] [5.148] [3.921]
choice & control 0.0945*** 0.0904*** 0.0963*** 0.0927***
[6.955] [6.639] [6.288] [6.074]
politics important -0.0419 -0.0679*
[-1.135] [-1.690]
housewife 0.543*** 0.684***
[2.710] [3.130]
student 0.958*** 1.141***
[4.449] [4.822]
retired 0.269* 0.367**
[1.797] [2.290]
educ.,arts org. 0.156 0.319**
[1.199] [2.194]
professional org. 0.475*** 0.418***
[3.246] [2.701]
sports, recr. org. 0.286*** 0.329***
[2.879] [2.668]
Constant 2.314*** 0.223 0.743** 0.564* 1.101*** 0.813** 2.627*** 2.332***
[12.55] [1.096] [2.426] [1.767] [3.357] [2.142] [4.822] [3.977]
Observations 4619 4535 4607 4524 4325 4299 3884 3867
R-squared 0.156 0.232 0.288 0.288 0.358 0.366 0.341 0.349
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.229 0.286 0.285 0.355 0.362 0.338 0.345
Sargan Chi-sq 32.91 31.97
Sargan p 0.133 0.159
Anderson-Rubin F 1.696 1.790
Anderson-Rubin p 0.0138 0.00731
Underidentification Chi-sq 237.8 213.6
Underidentification p 0 0
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Table 7: Explaining incomes: interactions between social capital, trust, and employ-
ment status.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES income income income income income income
IV IV IV IV IV IV
bridging -0.438 -0.0581 -0.121 -0.868* -0.448 -0.436
[-0.978] [-0.103] [-0.151] [-1.711] [-0.737] [-0.535]
bonding -1.517*** -2.609*** -0.657 -1.415** -2.461*** -0.771
[-2.624] [-3.643] [-0.528] [-2.372] [-3.364] [-0.596]
bridXtrust -0.939 -1.097
[-0.656] [-0.769]
bondXtrust 3.678*** 3.626***
[2.613] [2.581]
emplXbridg -0.456 -0.759
[-0.328] [-0.539]
emplXbond -1.530 -1.120
[-0.941] [-0.657]
trust 0.268*** -2.400** 0.269*** 0.247*** -2.310** 0.250***
[3.322] [-2.358] [3.320] [3.077] [-2.281] [3.096]
trust (mean) 2.612*** 2.261** 2.710*** 2.498*** 2.161** 2.622***
[2.696] [2.256] [2.766] [2.589] [2.165] [2.685]
employed 1.101*** 1.089*** 2.541** 1.463*** 1.454*** 2.671**
[13.57] [13.07] [2.391] [11.55] [11.19] [2.474]
czech -0.0856 -0.102 -0.0969 -0.171 -0.176 -0.177
[-0.668] [-0.777] [-0.754] [-1.335] [-1.348] [-1.369]
hungary -0.200* -0.172 -0.196 -0.190 -0.163 -0.188
[-1.662] [-1.381] [-1.629] [-1.579] [-1.310] [-1.550]
latvia -1.290*** -1.283*** -1.282*** -1.276*** -1.270*** -1.271***
[-4.420] [-4.293] [-4.367] [-4.388] [-4.270] [-4.338]
lithuania -0.129 -0.111 -0.128 -0.107 -0.0787 -0.109
[-0.778] [-0.654] [-0.759] [-0.633] [-0.458] [-0.636]
estonia 0.146 0.0979 0.114 0.106 0.0647 0.0836
[0.598] [0.391] [0.464] [0.434] [0.259] [0.343]
slovakia 1.230*** 1.203*** 1.230*** 1.243*** 1.222*** 1.245***
[10.44] [10.02] [10.30] [10.66] [10.28] [10.42]
slovenia 0.988*** 1.011*** 1.004*** 0.992*** 1.016*** 1.010***
[7.506] [7.460] [7.527] [7.545] [7.522] [7.571]
hh size 0.543*** 0.546*** 0.541*** 0.533*** 0.537*** 0.531***
[16.00] [15.66] [15.77] [15.57] [15.29] [15.41]
education 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.158*** 0.165*** 0.154***
[5.527] [5.538] [5.340] [5.014] [5.070] [4.832]
town size 0.0950*** 0.0954*** 0.0955*** 0.0884*** 0.0891*** 0.0880***
[6.517] [6.391] [6.254] [6.031] [5.950] [5.828]
stable relationship 0.887*** 0.906*** 0.885*** 0.868*** 0.883*** 0.863***
[10.47] [10.46] [10.18] [10.14] [10.10] [9.963]
age -0.0772*** -0.0791*** -0.0761*** -0.0623*** -0.0650*** -0.0639***
[-6.045] [-6.036] [-5.605] [-4.794] [-4.869] [-4.299]
age2 0.000674*** 0.000700*** 0.000657*** 0.000525*** 0.000557*** 0.000537***
[5.148] [5.199] [4.543] [3.921] [4.039] [3.552]
choice & control 0.0963*** 0.0944*** 0.0967*** 0.0927*** 0.0911*** 0.0932***
[6.288] [5.982] [6.182] [6.074] [5.798] [5.972]
politics important -0.0679* -0.0565 -0.0686*
[-1.690] [-1.366] [-1.699]
housewife 0.684*** 0.710*** 0.673***
[3.130] [3.178] [2.863]
student 1.141*** 1.105*** 1.053***
[4.822] [4.560] [3.391]
retired 0.367** 0.375** 0.351*
[2.290] [2.287] [1.886]
educ.,arts org. 0.319** 0.308** 0.311**
[2.194] [2.043] [2.117]
professional org. 0.418*** 0.432*** 0.418***
[2.701] [2.730] [2.679]
sports, recr. org. 0.329*** 0.294** 0.327**
[2.668] [2.345] [2.390]
Constant 2.627*** 3.459*** 1.773* 2.332*** 3.084*** 1.690
[4.822] [5.318] [1.820] [3.977] [4.533] [1.619]
Observations 3884 3884 3884 3867 3867 3867
R-squared 0.341 0.310 0.338 0.349 0.319 0.345
Adjusted R-squared 0.338 0.306 0.334 0.345 0.314 0.340
Sargan Chi-sq 32.91 43.06 41.09 31.97 40.79 39.01
Sargan p 0.133 0.0734 0.0676 0.159 0.112 0.101
Anderson-Rubin F 1.696 1.848 1.740 1.790 1.847 1.743
Anderson-Rubin p 0.0138 0.00177 0.00557 0.00731 0.00180 0.00542
Underidentification Chi-sq 237.8 168.9 93.67 213.6 163.9 88.73
Underidentification p 0 0 1.80e-08 0 0 1.02e-07
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and make greater profits out of the family resources one already has. Somewhat in
contrast to our expectations, no such effect is found for bridging social capital.6
5.2 Bridging and bonding social capital and trust as deter-
minants of subjective well-being
Let us now discuss the impacts of bridging and bonding social capital and social trust
on individuals’ subjective well-being. In Table 8 it is demonstrated that, other things
equal, both bridging and bonding social capital make people more satisfied with their
lives. It seems that people derive satisfaction both from contacts with non-kin and
with kin. This result is robust across all specifications tested in Table 8.
The structure of this table is similar to the one of Table 6. Going from left to
right, we observe increasing complexity of the estimation technique. At the same
time, more and more control variables are taken care of, whose omission might have
affected specifications (1)–(2). In models (3)–(4), we use the IV technique to capture
the endogeneity of individuals’ incomes (discussed in the previous subsection). In
models (5)–(6), we address endogeneity of social capital variables as well, but we
do not account for the simultaneous impact of social trust. Models (7)–(8) control
for both issues. In each “pair” of specifications mentioned above, the former does
not include several important conditioning variables such as employment status, sex,
household size, and whether the respondent is in a stable relationship, and the latter
does.
In addition to the instruments used in income regressions, here we also used as
instruments: individuals’ education, size of town of residence, number of children, the
status of a student, retired person, and housewife. We did not use the sex variable as
instrument this time because it turned out to be correlated with the error term. Model
(8) in Table 8 is our preferred specification because it controls for most caveats, and
passes all relevant econometric tests, including the Sargan test for instrument validity
and the underidentification test for instrument relevance.
Our results are the following. First, as opposed to some earlier studies (e.g.,
Growiec, 2009a), we find that other things equal, both bridging and bonding social
capital increase individuals’ happiness. This may be due to the fact that people
who have social contacts are generally happier than those who don’t have them,
disregarding with whom they keep in touch (Diener and Seligman, 2002). It is also
6These results should be interpreted with caution, though. Please keep in mind that the current
analysis is constrained by the rather low correlation of instruments with the endogenous explanatory
variables, especially the interaction terms. Hence, it could also be the case that the instruments fail
to capture some relationships. The IV estimator, though unbiased, might be inefficient here.
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likely that more detailed measures of happiness are needed to identify the differences
between the impacts of contacts with kin and non-kin in this respect (Growiec, 2009a).
We also find that individuals’ trust is generally positively related to happiness,
even if one controls for social capital and earnings, but the mean level of trust in
one’s reference group exerts a negative impact on their well-being.
When it comes to our control variables, we analyzed the impact on happiness
of sex, age, age squared, income, employment status, household size, retired status,
housewife status, perceived freedom of choice and control, and being in a stable
relationship. Income is found to have a positive impact on one’s well-being. The
same holds for being retired and being a housewife. Household size has a negative
impact on happiness, indicating that other things equal, living together with extended
family or having many children lowers one’s happiness.
As far as further control variables are concerned, women are more satisfied with
their lives then men.7 This result contradicts the common idea that men are usually
happier then women, and it holds here specifically because of the large set of control
variables we use (including, e.g., household size and income).
The relationship between age and subjective well-being is U-shaped which means
that young and old people are generally happier then people in their middle age. This
finding is in good agreement with the established literature.
We also find that individuals who experience more freedom of choice and control
are significantly more satisfied with their lives than those who don’t. This finding
likely relates to the historical background of CEE countries which underwent tran-
sition from communist regimes to democracy and market economy. As argued by
Sztompka (2004) on the representative example of Poland, social change after the
revolution of 1989 was a traumatogenic one: the Polish society experienced a sudden,
comprehensive, fundamental, and unexpected change. The same holds for all CEE
countries: people from CEE countries had to switch rapidly from trained incapac-
ity – a long-run consequence of the communist system – to making proper use of
their personal opportunities and the new institutions. The former culture was based
on a philosophy of dependence instead of self-reliance, “political apathy, lack of en-
trepreneurial initiative, opportunistic double standards, disinterested envy against all
achievers and interpersonal distrust” (Sztompka, 1996), but later, those who managed
to reveal the sense of autonomy and control over their lives were in a better starting
position in the market economy and in their individual pursuit of happiness in the
new system.
We also find that people in a stable relationship are significantly more satisfied
7This is only true if one controls for a range of individual characteristics included in the regression.
In raw data, women are significantly less happy than men.
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with their lives – a result in line both with conventional knowledge and earlier research
(e.g. Pahl and Pevalin, 2005). A little surprisingly, it is also found that controlling
for incomes, employment status does not have any significant impact on happiness.
As is visible in Table 9, we find no direct evidence of interactions between social
capital, trust, and employment status in explaining subjective well-being. Model (8)
in Table 8, reproduced as model (4) in Table 9, delivers essentially the same results as
models including interaction terms. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind, that
the instruments used in these regressions, although valid and relevant, are relatively
weakly correlated with the endogenous interaction terms. Hence, it might also be the
case that some interactions are important in reality, only that our instruments fail to
identify these effects.
The construction of the survey scale of subjective well-being in WVS is the same
across all countries, so we can also interpret the coefficients on country dummies.
Our reference country is Poland, and therefore a positive sign on a country dummy
implies that citizens of this country are, on average, and controlling for differences in
all other characteristics included in the regression, more satisfied with life than the
Poles. Such “residual satisfaction” is found to be positive in the Czech Republic, and
negative in Slovakia, Estonia, and Slovenia.
In sum, our results are in agreement with the theory presented in Growiec and
Growiec (2010a) where an inverse U-shaped relationship between both types of social
capital and well-being was proposed. In Polish data, we found an insignificant rela-
tionship between bonding social capital and well-being, and interpreted it as being on
the“top”of the theoretical inverse U-shaped relationship. Despite the methodological
differences between both papers, WVS data confirm this finding for Poland here (see
the appendix); we see however that in other CEECs, where bonding social capital is
generally less abundant than in Poland, there is a positive relationship between the
two variables, locating most of CEECs on the increasing part of the curve.
5.3 Robustness to changes in methodology
As mentioned above, the main regressions of the current study have been run using
the instrumental variables estimation technique. We have however also conducted an
additional robustness check, with the objective to check how strongly affected our
results could have been if we had failed to detect this endogeneity.
Another worry with the results is that our dependent variables are categorical
(income class is an integer between 1 and 10; well-being is measured as a 4-step
scale), so that the assumption of equal step widths, standing behind OLS or IV,
might be invalid. In such case, the appropriate estimation technique should be or-
dered logit/probit. On the other hand, according to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
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Table 8: Explaining individual well-being: finding the appropriate regression specifi-
cation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness
OLS OLS IV[income] IV[income] IV IV IV IV
bridging 0.148*** 0.184*** 0.135*** 0.169*** 0.535*** 0.498*** 0.394*** 0.343***
[3.093] [3.805] [2.675] [3.364] [3.620] [3.808] [2.595] [2.614]
bonding 0.281*** 0.222*** 0.282*** 0.245*** 0.708*** 0.577*** 0.871*** 0.747***
[6.473] [5.066] [6.254] [5.355] [3.549] [2.721] [4.464] [3.581]
income 0.0436*** 0.0328*** 0.129*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.0997*** 0.105*** 0.111***
[10.06] [6.955] [4.480] [4.401] [6.061] [5.903] [4.102] [4.264]
trust 0.0709*** 0.0818*** 0.0465* 0.0600** 0.0368 0.0487*
[3.023] [3.463] [1.826] [2.394] [1.337] [1.776]
trust (mean) 0.0259 0.000508 -0.635** -0.601** -0.449 -0.553**
[0.161] [0.00310] [-2.253] [-2.313] [-1.620] [-2.093]
employed 0.0376 -0.00587 -0.0216 -0.0641
[1.544] [-0.128] [-0.494] [-1.593]
czech 0.0270 0.0122 0.0618* 0.0386 0.103*** 0.0773** 0.108*** 0.0884**
[0.838] [0.378] [1.777] [1.135] [2.765] [2.055] [2.703] [2.178]
hungary -0.0124 -0.0258 0.0136 -0.00132 0.0632* 0.0489 0.0718* 0.0576
[-0.383] [-0.785] [0.394] [-0.0380] [1.766] [1.360] [1.856] [1.498]
latvia -0.102 -0.0811 0.0330 0.0119 0.0463 0.0477 0.0775 0.0780
[-1.233] [-0.980] [0.340] [0.132] [0.477] [0.505] [0.743] [0.777]
lithuania -0.104** -0.113*** -0.0879** -0.101** 0.0181 -0.0204 0.0435 0.00754
[-2.478] [-2.708] [-2.006] [-2.350] [0.331] [-0.370] [0.771] [0.132]
estonia -0.224*** -0.247*** -0.238*** -0.264*** -0.198** -0.225*** -0.173** -0.202**
[-3.244] [-3.623] [-3.315] [-3.755] [-2.519] [-2.900] [-2.155] [-2.541]
slovakia -0.230*** -0.222*** -0.325*** -0.308*** -0.294*** -0.295*** -0.277*** -0.286***
[-7.224] [-6.989] [-6.970] [-7.129] [-7.066] [-7.231] [-5.704] [-6.131]
slovenia -0.125*** -0.135*** -0.207*** -0.192*** -0.129*** -0.125*** -0.165*** -0.163***
[-3.258] [-3.528] [-4.182] [-4.355] [-2.757] [-2.805] [-3.242] [-3.504]
hh size -0.00337 -0.0421** -0.0362** -0.0462***
[-0.327] [-2.502] [-2.546] [-2.609]
stable relationship 0.248*** 0.178*** 0.165*** 0.155***
[10.49] [5.595] [4.909] [4.083]
age -0.0133*** -0.0265*** -0.0140*** -0.0215*** -0.0146*** -0.0217*** -0.0159*** -0.0206***
[-4.062] [-7.258] [-4.039] [-5.281] [-3.747] [-5.192] [-4.048] [-4.589]
age2 9.66e-05*** 0.000238*** 0.000109*** 0.000183*** 0.000116*** 0.000190*** 0.000146*** 0.000186***
[2.892] [6.233] [2.887] [4.353] [2.885] [4.376] [3.528] [4.076]
choice & control 0.0663*** 0.0664*** 0.0564*** 0.0577*** 0.0537*** 0.0530***
[15.49] [15.50] [10.57] [11.42] [9.460] [9.633]
female 0.0674*** 0.0580*** 0.0583** 0.0510**
[3.471] [2.859] [2.474] [2.168]
retired 0.125** 0.0994** 0.0756* 0.0542
[2.506] [2.152] [1.750] [1.093]
housewife 0.132** 0.0541 0.168*** 0.0910
[2.239] [0.851] [2.660] [1.309]
Constant 1.369*** 1.501*** 1.189*** 1.400*** 1.009*** 1.267*** 0.677*** 0.937***
[14.43] [14.69] [10.23] [12.78] [5.076] [6.576] [3.424] [4.813]
Observations 4422 4243 4403 4226 4102 3917 3978 3799
R-squared 0.144 0.166 0.070 0.111 0.034 0.059 0.052 0.071
Adjusted R-squared 0.141 0.162 0.0660 0.107 0.0309 0.0545 0.0489 0.0663
Sargan Chi-sq 11.21 11.61 27.56 30.40 25.46 27.14
Sargan p 0.593 0.771 0.153 0.251 0.228 0.511
Anderson-Rubin F 2.373 1.912 4.686 3.945 3.276 2.485
Anderson-Rubin p 0.00275 0.0133 0 0 1.24e-07 1.01e-05
Underidentification Chi-sq 112.3 162.6 189.3 176.2 132.7 133.2
Underidentification p 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 9: Explaining individual well-being: interactions between social capital, trust,
and employment status.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness
IV IV IV IV IV IV
bridging 0.394*** 0.446** 0.524* 0.343*** 0.362** 0.350*
[2.595] [2.247] [1.892] [2.614] [2.125] [1.797]
bonding 0.871*** 0.821*** 0.677** 0.747*** 0.801*** 0.353
[4.464] [3.464] [2.492] [3.581] [3.130] [0.958]
bridXtrust -0.207 -0.179
[-0.428] [-0.399]
bondXtrust -0.263 -0.264
[-0.595] [-0.589]
emplXbridg -0.303 0.0315
[-0.615] [0.110]
emplXbond 0.153 0.563
[0.564] [1.337]
income 0.105*** 0.0934*** 0.0947*** 0.111*** 0.0978*** 0.103***
[4.102] [4.666] [3.169] [4.264] [3.924] [3.948]
trust 0.0368 0.344 0.0386 0.0487* 0.348 0.0506*
[1.337] [1.070] [1.396] [1.776] [1.053] [1.850]
trust (mean) -0.449 -0.383 -0.409 -0.553** -0.434* -0.514*
[-1.620] [-1.553] [-1.469] [-2.093] [-1.698] [-1.940]
czech 0.108*** 0.0894** 0.0912** 0.0884** 0.0851** 0.0828**
[2.703] [2.274] [2.251] [2.178] [2.113] [2.046]
hungary 0.0718* 0.0635* 0.0631 0.0576 0.0523 0.0547
[1.856] [1.653] [1.643] [1.498] [1.364] [1.429]
latvia 0.0775 0.0384 0.0432 0.0780 0.0601 0.0596
[0.743] [0.383] [0.404] [0.777] [0.608] [0.593]
lithuania 0.0435 0.0254 0.0238 0.00754 0.00412 -0.00164
[0.771] [0.459] [0.425] [0.132] [0.0734] [-0.0289]
estonia -0.173** -0.172** -0.177** -0.202** -0.193** -0.202**
[-2.155] [-2.170] [-2.247] [-2.541] [-2.436] [-2.558]
slovakia -0.277*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.286*** -0.269*** -0.284***
[-5.704] [-5.972] [-5.418] [-6.131] [-5.895] [-6.024]
slovenia -0.165*** -0.152*** -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.153*** -0.166***
[-3.242] [-3.229] [-2.876] [-3.504] [-3.301] [-3.484]
age -0.0159*** -0.0138*** -0.0151*** -0.0206*** -0.0216*** -0.0215***
[-4.048] [-3.546] [-3.282] [-4.589] [-4.821] [-4.651]
age2 0.000146*** 0.000125*** 0.000140*** 0.000186*** 0.000193*** 0.000199***
[3.528] [3.140] [2.889] [4.076] [4.254] [4.176]
choice & control 0.0537*** 0.0536*** 0.0538*** 0.0530*** 0.0542*** 0.0529***
[9.460] [9.712] [9.366] [9.633] [9.882] [9.543]
employed -0.0641 -0.0490 -0.531
[-1.593] [-1.249] [-1.589]
hh size -0.0462*** -0.0394** -0.0412**
[-2.609] [-2.280] [-2.344]
stable relationship 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.169***
[4.083] [4.443] [4.356]
female 0.0510** 0.0508** 0.0593**
[2.168] [2.170] [2.429]
Constant 0.677*** 0.691*** 0.801*** 0.937*** 0.899*** 1.269***
[3.424] [3.128] [3.284] [4.813] [3.911] [4.277]
Observations 3978 3867 3867 3799 3799 3799
R-squared 0.052 0.073 0.074 0.071 0.087 0.079
Adjusted R-squared 0.0489 0.0690 0.0696 0.0663 0.0823 0.0743
Sargan Chi-sq 25.46 30.11 28.71 27.14 34.33 31.14
Sargan p 0.228 0.309 0.276 0.511 0.452 0.510
Anderson-Rubin F 3.276 2.585 2.759 2.485 2.051 2.163
Anderson-Rubin p 1.24e-07 2.72e-06 9.52e-07 1.01e-05 0.000136 6.06e-05
Underidentification Chi-sq 132.7 153.4 81.24 133.2 120.8 118.9
Underidentification p 0 0 1.35e-07 0 0 0
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(2004), one generally should not expect large differences between results of OLS and
ordered logit/probit regressions in explaining happiness. As shown in Table 10, our
dataset confirms broadly their findings. OLS and ordered logit estimates are very
different from the estimates obtained when potential endogeneity is controlled for. A
further comforting feature of these results is that the threshold levels estimated in
the ordered logit regression are roughly equally-spaced, thus somewhat supporting
our initial linearity assumption. In the case of earnings, this reassuring result is likely
because the country-specific income thresholds follow an approximately logarithmic
scale, and are thus in line with the Mincerian specification of the wage equation (cf.
Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2003).
The results presented in Table 10 indicate that endogeneity of bridging and bond-
ing social capital is clearly a serious problem in our analysis. Not only is endogeneity
confirmed with the Chi-square test; it has also an important impact on the obtained
results. If one uses OLS or ordered logit instead of instrumental variables, then the
obtained estimates change significantly.
6 Conclusion
In the current paper, we have validated, with cross-sectional World Values Survey
2000 data, the predictions of our theoretical model specified in Growiec and Growiec
(2010b), thereby improving the understanding of the patterns of social capital, trust,
and disparities in economic development and well-being across Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs). We have demonstrated that majority of citizens of
these countries seem to fall in a “low trust trap” where the stocks of bridging social
capital and trust levels are both low. The broad relationships identified here between
bridging and bonding social capital, trust, subjective well-being, and individuals’
earnings are robust to the inclusion of a range of personal characteristics (such as
education, size of town of residence, the degree of freedom of choice and control,
living in a stable relationship, etc.) as control variables. Both considered types of
social capital exert a positive effect on individuals’ happiness, and bonding social
capital also has a decidedly negative effect on their earnings. The direction of impact
of bridging social capital on incomes is ambiguous, although negative impact is more
likely. Both these adverse effects on earnings should be also treated as indirect adverse
effects on well-being, as earnings are robustly positively correlated with well-being,
even after controlling for a range of auxiliary variables, and after instrumenting for
earnings to avoid the endogeneity problem.
We have also found that endogeneity and omitted variables bias are serious issues
in the analysis of the impact of social capital and trust on earnings or well-being.
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Table 10: Robustness to changes in estimation methodology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES income income income happiness happiness happiness
OLS O Logit IV OLS O Logit IV
bridging -0.0691 -0.143 -0.868* 0.184*** 0.575*** 0.343***
[-0.430] [-0.977] [-1.711] [3.805] [3.479] [2.614]
bonding -0.312** -0.330*** -1.415** 0.222*** 0.739*** 0.747***
[-2.243] [-2.624] [-2.372] [5.066] [5.049] [3.581]
trust 0.215*** 0.202*** 0.247*** 0.0818*** 0.287*** 0.0487*
[2.873] [2.992] [3.077] [3.463] [3.560] [1.776]
trust (mean) 2.652*** 2.121*** 2.498*** 0.000508 -0.00920 -0.553**
[2.930] [2.593] [2.589] [0.00310] [-0.0165] [-2.093]
employed 1.384*** 1.253*** 1.463*** 0.0376 0.126 -0.0641
[11.69] [11.11] [11.55] [1.544] [1.534] [-1.593]
czech -0.0546 -0.288*** -0.171 0.0122 0.00576 0.0884**
[-0.478] [-2.764] [-1.335] [0.378] [0.0521] [2.178]
hungary -0.0946 -0.0622 -0.190 -0.0258 -0.0801 0.0576
[-0.851] [-0.625] [-1.579] [-0.785] [-0.702] [1.498]
latvia -1.198*** -1.031*** -1.276*** -0.0811 -0.375 0.0780
[-4.495] [-4.377] [-4.388] [-0.980] [-1.371] [0.777]
lithuania 0.0958 0.0294 -0.107 -0.113*** -0.432*** 0.00754
[0.734] [0.260] [-0.633] [-2.708] [-3.092] [0.132]
estonia 0.277 0.165 0.106 -0.247*** -0.800*** -0.202**
[1.268] [0.829] [0.434] [-3.623] [-3.579] [-2.541]
slovakia 1.253*** 0.958*** 1.243*** -0.222*** -0.739*** -0.286***
[12.43] [10.26] [10.66] [-6.989] [-6.818] [-6.131]
slovenia 0.985*** 0.745*** 0.992*** -0.135*** -0.490*** -0.163***
[7.962] [6.511] [7.545] [-3.528] [-3.764] [-3.504]
hh size 0.549*** 0.510*** 0.533*** -0.00337 -0.0137 -0.0462***
[17.06] [16.36] [15.57] [-0.327] [-0.392] [-2.609]
education 0.165*** 0.150*** 0.158***
[5.611] [5.594] [5.014]
town size 0.0963*** 0.0886*** 0.0884***
[7.119] [7.184] [6.031]
stable relationship 0.852*** 0.936*** 0.868*** 0.248*** 0.825*** 0.155***
[11.36] [13.20] [10.14] [10.49] [10.24] [4.083]
age -0.0578*** -0.0508*** -0.0623*** -0.0265*** -0.0930*** -0.0206***
[-4.827] [-4.573] [-4.794] [-7.258] [-7.450] [-4.589]
age2 0.000494*** 0.000411*** 0.000525*** 0.000238*** 0.000844*** 0.000186***
[3.934] [3.523] [3.921] [6.233] [6.482] [4.076]
choice & control 0.0904*** 0.0826*** 0.0927*** 0.0664*** 0.230*** 0.0530***
[6.639] [6.648] [6.074] [15.50] [15.13] [9.633]
politics important -0.0419 -0.0571* -0.0679*
[-1.135] [-1.694] [-1.690]
housewife 0.543*** 0.418** 0.684***
[2.710] [2.256] [3.130]
student 0.958*** 0.984*** 1.141***
[4.449] [4.895] [4.822]
retired 0.269* 0.256* 0.367**
[1.797] [1.834] [2.290]
educ.,arts org. 0.156 0.207* 0.319**
[1.199] [1.764] [2.194]
professional org. 0.475*** 0.379*** 0.418***
[3.246] [2.830] [2.701]
sports, recr. org. 0.286*** 0.281*** 0.329***
[2.879] [3.129] [2.668]
income 0.0328*** 0.108*** 0.111***
[6.955] [6.696] [4.264]
female 0.0674*** 0.229*** 0.0510**
[3.471] [3.487] [2.168]
Constant 0.813** 2.332*** 1.501*** 0.937***
[2.142] [3.977] [14.69] [4.813]
Observations 4299 4299 3867 4243 4243 3799
R-squared 0.366 0.349 0.166 0.071
Adjusted R-squared 0.362 0.345 0.162 0.0663
Sargan Chi-sq 31.97 27.14
Sargan p 0.159 0.511
Anderson-Rubin F 1.790 2.485
Anderson-Rubin p 0.00731 1.01e-05
Underidentification Chi-sq 213.6 133.2
Underidentification p 0 0
cut1 0.653* [1.860] cut1 -2.630*** [-7.412]
cut2 1.638*** [4.670] cut2 -0.251 [-0.719]
cut3 2.583*** [7.350] cut3 3.313*** [9.386]
cut4 3.345*** [9.486]
cut5 4.247*** [11.97]
cut6 4.854*** [13.62]
cut7 5.635*** [15.70]
cut8 6.344*** [17.52]
cut9 7.091*** [19.31]
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One ought to be careful when addressing both problems, as otherwise one will likely
obtain certain spurious results, such as a strong positive causal impact of bridging
social capital on earnings.
We also argue that an increase in labor market participation can be perceived as
a potential way out of this “low trust trap”, because employed people in CEECs have
statistically significantly more bridging social capital, less bonding social capital, and
more trust. Furthermore, quite naturally, being employed provides direct increases in
individuals’ earnings, which then subsequently increase their well-being as well.
What remains on our research agenda is to pursue a more macro-oriented empirical
analysis aimed at assessing, to which extent bridging and bonding social capital should
be considered parts of“social infrastructure”, or more generally – socio-economic insti-
tutions – driving cross-country differences in productivity. We think that international
survey data from the WVS might be very useful in this respect.
Another line of research which ought to be done is to use panel data to draw
more precise conclusions on causal links between social capital variables, trust, and
economic performance of individuals and countries. Unfortunately, in this respect,
we are facing an unsurmountable data availability problem, at least with WVS data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Robustness to cross-country heterogeneity
If the relationships between discussed variables are non-linear in their nature or if the
coefficients (not only the constants) vary across countries, the regressions estimated on
internationally pooled data might hide some interesting cross-country idiosyncracies.
To detect these specific factors, we have re-run the regressions from the previous
section for each country separately.
In Tables 11–12 we see the results of these regressions. Each of the tables contains
5 regressions, one for each country in our sample, excluding Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia (due to the scarcity of observations for these countries), in our favorite spec-
ifications – with the usual set of conditioning variables. It is clear than these results
are unstable, most likely because of limited sample sizes and large data requirements
posed by the IV method. They must be interpreted with caution.
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Table 11: Explaining income. Cross-country differences in estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES income income income income income
Czech Rep Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Poland
bridging -0.0969 -0.790 -0.716 0.536 0.573
[-0.109] [-0.940] [-0.676] [0.360] [0.542]
bonding -1.669* -1.348 0.0766 -3.709** -0.180
[-1.658] [-1.585] [0.0761] [-2.560] [-0.151]
trust 0.00280 0.405*** 0.186 0.353 0.170
[0.0177] [2.684] [0.880] [1.229] [1.045]
trust (mean) 7.780** -6.117** 1.343 4.653 5.799*
[2.257] [-2.140] [0.373] [1.075] [1.734]
employed 1.534*** 0.834*** 1.969*** 1.728*** 0.826***
[4.182] [3.577] [6.730] [4.404] [3.585]
hh size 0.954*** 0.0378 0.881*** 0.845*** 0.0455
[11.20] [0.662] [10.46] [8.579] [0.719]
education 0.0677 0.396*** 0.194*** 0.320 0.00999
[0.732] [3.272] [3.011] [1.306] [0.131]
town size 0.158*** -0.0174 0.151*** 0.130** 0.0636**
[5.196] [-0.682] [3.970] [2.171] [2.224]
stable relationship 0.980*** 0.739*** 0.872*** 1.276*** 0.523***
[5.705] [4.922] [4.248] [3.599] [3.128]
age -0.0186 -0.0793*** -0.0209 -0.0565 -0.0726***
[-0.648] [-3.602] [-0.603] [-1.086] [-2.849]
age2 -6.97e-05 0.000888*** -2.16e-06 0.000721 0.000760***
[-0.230] [3.998] [-0.00572] [1.228] [3.270]
choice & control 0.111*** 0.129*** 0.0421 0.108** 0.116***
[3.188] [4.916] [1.106] [2.044] [3.978]
politics important -0.102 -0.0284 -0.0277 0.0714 -0.140*
[-1.206] [-0.374] [-0.281] [0.484] [-1.848]
housewife 0.957* 0.627 1.373** 0.276 0.542
[1.813] [1.445] [2.152] [0.334] [1.516]
student 0.841 0.602 2.207*** 0.744 1.118**
[1.624] [1.349] [3.610] [0.858] [2.500]
retired 0.193 0.137 0.186 1.118** 0.268
[0.454] [0.494] [0.431] [2.187] [0.921]
educ.,arts org. -0.238 -0.262 0.459 0.546 0.618
[-1.018] [-0.694] [1.291] [1.310] [1.345]
professional org. 0.634** 0.588* 0.0848 0.0574 -0.115
[2.360] [1.803] [0.216] [0.122] [-0.330]
sports, recr. org. -0.0954 0.248 0.375 0.646* -0.0844
[-0.486] [0.767] [1.371] [1.842] [-0.195]
Constant -0.604 4.772*** 0.531 0.594 2.586*
[-0.499] [4.835] [0.431] [0.347] [1.930]
Observations 920 688 708 388 707
R-squared 0.463 0.180 0.455 0.437 0.182
Adjusted R-squared 0.452 0.157 0.440 0.408 0.160
Sargan Chi-sq 40.94 19.57 24.93 41.33 16.55
Sargan p 0.00838 0.610 0.301 0.00753 0.788
Anderson-Rubin F 1.859 1.010 1.032 2.219 0.678
Anderson-Rubin p 0.00752 0.451 0.421 0.00103 0.876
Underidentification Chi-sq 70.95 66.70 76.20 42.88 40.15
Underidentification p 8.66e-07 3.89e-06 1.30e-07 0.00715 0.0148
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Table 12: Explaining happiness. Cross-country differences in estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES happiness happiness happiness happiness happiness
Czech Rep Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Poland
bridging 0.296* 1.181*** -0.495** 0.119 0.667**
[1.657] [3.186] [-1.989] [0.330] [1.976]
bonding -0.0501 0.691* 1.054*** 0.176 0.477
[-0.201] [1.729] [3.171] [0.411] [1.030]
income 0.0185 0.172** 0.0785** 0.0365 0.130*
[0.666] [2.136] [2.238] [0.983] [1.887]
trust 0.0654* -0.0392 0.0261 0.236*** 0.0467
[1.667] [-0.489] [0.389] [2.854] [0.663]
trust (mean) 0.0568 -0.571 -1.104 -0.740 0.589
[0.120] [-1.242] [-1.100] [-1.412] [0.698]
employed 0.0195 -0.166* 0.136 0.00375 0.0664
[0.348] [-1.853] [1.398] [0.0389] [0.918]
hh size -0.0567* -0.0121 -0.0124 0.00404 0.0439*
[-1.687] [-0.434] [-0.309] [0.0981] [1.725]
stable relationship 0.271*** 0.217** 0.0723 0.296*** 0.319***
[5.326] [2.306] [0.971] [2.689] [4.126]
age -0.0318*** -0.0155 -0.0203* -0.0240* -0.0115
[-4.508] [-1.298] [-1.835] [-1.709] [-0.955]
age2 0.000307*** 0.000140 0.000135 0.000205 9.18e-05
[4.153] [1.163] [1.134] [1.309] [0.787]
choice & control 0.0483*** 0.0309* 0.0836*** 0.0994*** 0.0438***
[5.325] [1.847] [6.896] [6.263] [3.017]
female 0.0567 0.0848 -0.0661 -0.0102 0.229***
[1.579] [1.325] [-1.161] [-0.146] [4.029]
retired 0.341***
[2.618]
children -0.0753***
[-3.015]
Constant 2.059*** 0.477 0.952*** 1.278*** 0.136
[8.380] [1.002] [2.730] [2.954] [0.243]
Observations 920 683 699 383 699
R-squared 0.114 0.052 0.112 0.228 0.148
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.0347 0.0936 0.203 0.133
Sargan Chi-sq 26.15 16.47 32.11 25.78 28.80
Sargan p 0.510 0.943 0.155 0.531 0.371
Anderson-Rubin F 0.971 1.262 1.784 0.840 1.355
Anderson-Rubin p 0.511 0.161 0.00815 0.710 0.0994
Underidentification Chi-sq 64.45 36.92 71.21 40.77 35.38
Underidentification p 0.000107 0.121 4.41e-06 0.0564 0.159
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